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FROM ^rODERX PHYSICS TO RELIGION
I.—Professor Eddingtoii's Metaphysics, Philosophy and Theology
BY VICTOR S. YARROS
PROFESSOR A. S. EDDIXGTOX, the distinguished British
astronomer, physicist and educator^ has published an extra-
ordinary book entitled The Xatnre of the Physical World. It is,
in reality, a revised series of university lectures, and has some of the
defects of semi-popular lectures. These defects, however, will not
trouble the general lay reader, or even the studious and cultivated
reader. The book is brilliant, unconventionel as to form, exception-
ally well written and in m.ore than one place delightfully humorous
and witty. Critics have said that the book is literature as well as
rigorous science, and the\' mav be right. It fascinates, intrigues
and diverts even while it Instructs and elucidates the most difficult
problems In modern ph\slcs and modern philosophy.
It is hardly necessar}' to say that it is up to date in every respect.
It is Einsteinian and Planckian, and more. As an exposition and
interpretation of the new phwsics. It leaves nothing to be desired.
But in that part of its task it is not In any sense original.
The original, daring and surprising elements of the book are to
be found In the pages—and there are many of them—in which the
metaphysical, philosophical and religious aspects of modern exact
science are discussed b_\' the author. For he does not stay within the
safe limits of science. He is interested in the deeper and more im-
portant problems that challenge the mind of man. He ventures
boldly beyond science ; he even admits and defends mysticism ; he
has room for and need of theology, religion and God. He upholds
the validity of claims which other savants decline to recognize, or
treat with scorn and supercilious contempt.
It Is the extra-scientific parts of the book that I propose to notice
and comment upon in this paper. The reader who is conversant
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with the teachings of Whitehead, Russell, Jeans and other British
scientists will find much in Professor Eddington's book that will
suggest fruitful comparisons and pregnant questions.
Perhaps the best way to call attention to the issues raised by
Professor Eddington is that of direct quotation. Here is what he
sa\s about "the nature of the conviction from which religion arises" :
"The conviction which we postulate is that certain
states of awareness in consciousness have at least ecjual
significance with those which are called sensations. Amid
[the former] must be found the basis from which a spir-
itual religion arises. The conviction is scarcely a matter to
be argued about ; it is dependent on the forcefulness of the
feeling of awareness.
. . . The idea of a universal Mind or
Logos would be. 1 tliink, a fairly plausible inference from
the present state of scientific incjuiry : at least, it is in har-
mony with it."
"We ha\e to l)ui]d the s])iritual world out of s^nibols
taken from our own personalitw as we build the scientific
world out of the metrical s\mbols of the mathematician
.... \Ve must be able to ap])roach the \\'orld-Spirit in the
midst of our cares and duties in that simpler relation of
spirit to spirit in which all true religion finds exi)ression."
"We cannot pretend to olTer proofs. Proof is an idol
before whom the pure mathematician tortures himself. In
physics we are generally content to sacrifice before the
lesser shrine of Plausibility:"
In addition to the foregoing significant quotations, we may note
that Professor Eddington believes that the stuiT of the universe is
mental, not material, nor neutral, and that modern phwsics, in his
view, has wiped out the old distinction between natural and super-
natural i)henomena. Since the world is full of marvels, mysteries,
unknown and perhaps unknowable things; since we df) not know
what the atom is, what it does, and why it does it, it is nf) longer an
objection to any affirmation to sa\- that it iinplics the "supernatural."
or an argument pro any statement that it avoids the assumption of
supernatural phenomena.
Einally. we may quote \erbatim Professor Eddington's own
very useful summar}- of the cardinal ])oints of his metaphysico-
j)hilosophical reflections.
"1. The symbolic nature of the entities of • i)hysics is
generally recognized, and the scheme of physics is now
formulated in such a way as to make it almost self-evident
that it is a partial a.spect of something else.
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"2. Strict causality is abandoned in the material world.
Our ideas of the controlling laws are in process of recon-
struction, and it is not possible to predict what kind of form
they will ultimately take; but all the indications are that
strict causality has dropped out permanently. This relieves
the former necessit}' of supposing that mind is subject to
deterministic law, or, alternatively, that it can suspend de-
terministic law in the physical world.
"3. Recognizing that the physical world is entirel\- ab-
stract and without actualitw apart from its linkage to con-
sciousness, we restore consciousness to the fundamental
position instead of representing it as an inessential compli-
cation found in the midst of inorganic nature at a late
stage of evolutionarA- historv.
"4. The sanction for correlating a real physical world
to certain feelings of which we are conscious does not
seem to differ in any essential respect from the sanction
for correlating a spiritual domain to another side of our
personality."
We are now in a position to analyze and comment upon the
author's remarkable admissions or concessions to theological and
metaphysical orthodoxy.
Physical entities are undoubtedly mere symbols. Xaive realism
is dead. But is it logical to contend that behind the phenomena
we deal with symbolical!}- and abstractedly there is something men-
tal, something higher than the ph}'sical ? The world, to us, is what
our sensations, perceptions, inferences and reasoning processes
make it; but are we justified in assuming that what we do not sense
and perceive is nobler or higher than that wdiich we think we un-
derstand? The table which we use. or the typewriter, is not really
and exactly what it appears to be, but the aspects we do not per-
ceive are not necessarily nobler than those we do perceive. What is
the Universe? We do not know, but we have formed certain
notions of it, and these are inevitable, given the human mind and
the human body. What is behind and beyond the things we see,
hear, smell, touch and reason about, no human mind can possibly
know. Our notions and conceptions are pragmatic ; they cannot be
anything else. That which we cannot conceive remains a mystery.
Neither science nor common sense has anything to tell us about the
wider or higher entities referred to by Professor Eddington. The
Agnostic declines to speculate concerning those other entities.
But what of the assertion that the stuff of the world is mental?
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If that be granted, does it not follow that the stuff of the world is
also noble and spiritual ? l>y no means, for we have to define the
term "mental" as well as the term stuff. Let us pause to consider
Professor Eddington's own definitions of these terms. Thev are,
to say the least, singular and paradoxical.
He writes
:
"To put the conclusion crudely, the stuff of the world
is mind-stuff".
. . . The mind-stuff of the world is. of course,
something more general than our individual conscious
minds : but we may think of its nature as not altogether
foreign to the feelings in our consciousness.
. . . The mind-
stuff' is not spread in si)ace and time. . . ., but we must
j)resume that in some other way or aspect it can be differ-
entiated into parts. ( )nly here and there does it rise
to the level of consciousness, but from such islands pro-
ceeds all knowledge. . . . We are acquainted with an ex-
ternal world because its fibres run into our consciousness
:
it is only our own ends of the fibres that we actualK- know :
from these ends we more or less successfulK- reconstruct
the rest, as a paleontologist reconstructs an extinct monster
from its footprint. The mind-stuff is the aggregation of
relations and relata which form the building material for
the physical world. . . .
"Consciousness is not sharpl\- defined, but fades into
subconsciousness ; and be}ond that we must postulate some-
thing indefinite but yet continuous with our mental nature.
This I take to be the world-stuff. We liken it to our con-
scious feelings because, now that we are convinced of the
formal and symbolic character of the entities of ph\sics,
there is nothing else to liken it to."
IJertrand Russell's view, that the stuff' of the world is "neutral,"
our author rejects, because, he sa\s. tliat \icw implies that we have
two a\enues of approach to an understanding of the nature of the
world, whereas we have only one, namely, iliroiigh our direct knowl-
edije of iiiiiul.
The reasoning in the last quotation seems extraordinar\-. Tn
the first place, we are told that the terms mind-stuff do not mean
what the\' mean in ordinary discussions. Mind is not mind, and
stuff is not stuff as we know these things, or have conceived them
in the past. What we are to understand by mind-stuff is "the aggre-
gation of relations and relata which form the building material of
the physical world." This stuff we must liken to conscious feelings
because we cannot, now that we have discarded crude materialism.
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liken it to anything else. But what necessity is there for likening
that stuff to anything at all ? What end is served by calling it mind-
stuff? Does the comparison help us to understand that part of the
stuff which is beyond the fibres we know? The answer is in the
negative, unless we adopt the simple and naive beliefs of the ortho-
dox theologians. What we are entitled to say is this—that a certain
process which seems physical up to a certain point becomes mental
at that point, in our own use of the terms physical and mental.
\\'here and how the translation occurs, we do not know. The dif-
ferences we feel and know in the stages of the process need names,
however, and we coin them ; but let us not forget that the names
are our ozvn creation and remain just names. Professor Eddington
says that we "more or less successfully reconstruct the rest" of the
chain or process, the part beyond the fibres we know ; but he stops
here, tantalizingl}- enough, and does not tell us zvhat zee have re-
constructed and what the creation of our reason and imagination
looks life.
He does say. indeed, that it is not illogical or unreasonable to
assume a Great Universal ^lind, behind the mind we ourselves
possess and the mind-stuff' of the universe. This is a new version
of the old and fallacious Paley argument, but the version is scarcely
an improvement on the old notion. If it is not unreasonable to infer
a Great Alind, a Knower and Creator, a God, is it unreasonable to
infer that the Universal Alind is lodged in a brain resembling the
human and that the brain is part of a body resembling the human
body? If so, we are back in the camp of the fundamentalists, the
believers in a personal God amenable to prayer and persuasion.
\\'hat a lame and impotent conclusion that would be
!
The scheme of physics is indeed part of something else, but why
pretend that we knozv anything about the whole of w^hich physical
entities are a part?
Strict causality is abandoned by modern science, says Professor
Eddington truly, but does it follow that the mind of man is not sub-
ject to deterministic law? Is all causality to be dropped, and is
chaos to replace the conception of the reign of law? Certainl}- not.
The universe, after all, is not chaotic. We cannot trace all con-
sequences to causes, but that does not prove that the consequences
have not causes which w^e are ignorant of in our present state of
development. Because certain phenomena are as yet obscure and in-
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comprehensible, are we justified in asserting that they are fortuitous
and causeless?
The recognition that the physical world is abstract, continues
Professor Eddington in his summary, restores consciousness to its
former fundamental position. Why? Fundamental to humanity,
perhaps, but not fundamental in the cosmic scheme. We cannot
assue that our consciousness is as important to nature as it is to
ourselves. And of what significance is the fact that consciousness is
again fundamental, if it stops exactly where it did when it was
regarded as "an inessential complication of inorganic nature?"
Where we put consciousness is a matter of no moment. The ques-
tion is, what do we do with our theory of consciousness?
.\nd here we come to the crux of the discussion. Because of the
rehabilitation of consciousness, and because of our new orientation
in i)h\sics, Professor Eddington claims, a new sanction has emerged
for religion and mysticism. We correlate, he points out, a certain
"real" world to certain feelings of which we are conscious; why,
then, may we not correlate a certain spiritual domain to another
side of our personality? We may and, as scientific thinkers, should,
according to Professor Eddington. The sanction is of the same
kind in both cases, he contends, and the process of forming the
conception of a world of which our feelings give us only fleeting
glimpses is also the same.
The author illustrates his point by showing that mere ])hysical
phenomena lead us to such concepts as Beauty, Harmony, Unity.
]^rere physics thus engenders admiration, wonder, exaltation, rever-
ence. Why should not other experiences and feelings in us lead to
concepts of the religious t}pe? he asks. Well, the answer is that
they do not necessarily or always engender such concepts, and.
where they do, the concepts are barren and might as well not exist.
There are no Agnostics so far as Beauty is concerned, but there
are .\gnostics in religion and theology. Professor Eddington fails
to account for widespread Agnosticism, although he does insist
that those who claim they have vivid religious feelings and experi-
ences should suit action to profession and show that religion is to
them a living and potent reality, not a mere empty form of lip-
service.
There is absolutely no objection to correlating a spiritual domain
to a given side of our personality, provided we know what we
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mean by a spiritvial domain. Professor Eddington does not stop to
characterize or delimit the spiritual domain. He assumes that mor-
als and esthetics belong to that domain, but neither morals nor
esthetics are dependent upon theology.
Repeatedly Dr. Eddington mentions God, but he refrains from
telling us what he means by that term. He fails also to attribute
any role to his God. As Bertrand Russell says. Professor Edding-
ton seems to believe that his God had something to do with the
world in a remote past but abdicated long ago and has forgotten his
creation. Such a conception of God is neither philosophical nor
practical or sensible. How can we correlate it with our feelings
and experiences, pray?
Mr. Russell suspects that Professor Eddington is not wholl}'
candid with his readers, but holds something back. This is extremely
improbable. He is misty and nebulous, to be sure, but only because
his ideas "beyond physics" are vague and rudimentary. He feels
that there is something beyond physics, as does Santayana, but what
that something is, no one is able to conceive. Why not confess ig-
norance and stop there?
It is impossible to escape the conclusion of a certain rational
idealism—namely, that we know nothing of the actual physical
world, and that our senses and perceptions may be grossly unfaith-
ful to reality. But we have no appeal from our senses and percep-
tions. W'e have no other data or materials wherewith to build con-
ceptions and theories. We can only admit that the world may be
different from our image and idea of it; we can only bear in mind
that real, actual, ideal are our own terms coined to make distinc-
tions which we find necessary.
The claim of some thinkers that modern physics is furnishing
unexpected support to religious orthodoxy and undermining Ag-
nosticism is arresting enough, but, when we examine it closely, we
find that it is baseless. Modern physics tends rather to strengthen
Agnosticism and to extend it.
Professor Eddington himself virtually admits this. For instance,
in discussing the electron and its antics, he says that we may de-
scribe these things as "something unknown doing we don't know
what," and he maliciously and shockingly compares his own formula
with
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The slithy toves
did gyre and gimble in the vvabe,
and similar deHghtful nonsense.
Well, if all this be true, what meaning is there in the statement
that the stuff of the world is mental, or that physics as now taught
has abolished the distinction between the natural and the super-
natural, the real and the mystical? If we know nothing, what basis
is there for God and a so-called spiritual domain?
Dr. Eddington is at times the victim of his own wit, cleverness
and breadth. He is a foe of dogma in science or elsewhere, but he
mistakes the open mind, the genuinely scientific attitude, with a
mushy, thoughtless, demoralizing sentimentality. Science should be
modest, tentative, as he insists, but it is absurd to pretend that
science has no better foundation or sounder sanctions than, say,
orthodox theology. We have the right to demand that theology shall
be at least as scientific as are the more exact physical branches of
knowledge.
11. NEO-NATUR.\LISM AND XEO-RELIGIOX
Rcliciion, by Edward Scribner Ames. Holt and Co.
Here is a book which rationalists and Agnostics should welcome
as sincerel\- and fervently as will those who cling to a certain de-
gree of what may be called orthodoxy in their religious philosoph}-.
Prof. Ames may not be—indeed, is not—strikingly original in the
views he presents in this volume, but he is very persuasive, plausible,
lucid and candid. His essential teachings differ little from those
of Whitehead, Eddington and ]\Iillikan, but he is more intelligible
than any one of the erudite metaphysicians and physicists who have
lately attempted to return to religion, God and mysticism via physics
and mathematics. He has made a strong case, from his own point
of view, for the fundamentals of religion, and he will have to be
reckoned with.—that is. discussed and elaborately answered.
In the present brief notice only a few points can be considered,
but the}' will be the points which test at once the merits and the
weaknesses of Dr. Ames' position.
To Dr. Ames religion is something so profoundly natural and
human that to defend it, to try to prove its validit\- and legitimacy,
is to be guilty of the absurdity of laboriously demonstrating the self-
evident. But what is religion? To Dr. Ames, a way of contemplat-
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ing and reacting to the whole of nature, the totality of all phe-
nomena, physical and spiritual, intelligible and incomprehensible.
Nature is studied by the science piecemeal, and properly so. Things
have to be isolated for the purposes of science, and all observation
and experimentation have to be made under artificial conditions.
Truths yielded by science are valuable as far as they go, but they
leave much unexplained. The same is true of any philosophy that
claims to be scientific. Not so with religion. To religion nature
is something organic and indivisible. Man is part of it, and cannot
be supposed—as Huxley, for example, contends—to be at zvar with
the rest of nature. That is, human ethics cannot be really incom-
patible wntli cosmic ethics, whatever the appearances may suggest
to the superficial observer. Men's ideals and noblest conceptions
are as natural as the so-called animal passions and appetites which
he must satisfy, albeit in sublimated forms. The basic harmonies
of nature are clear to religion, if not to science. And religion in-
spires effort to banish apparent discords and reduce or eradicate
apparent evil.
God, to Dr. Ames, is nature viewed as functioning in a certain
way, the wa}' that leads to the most abundant and worthiest of
lives from the human point of view. In other words, God is a
name we humans give to the ideal and the excellent in ourselves
and therefore in nature. Since ideals exist, and since moral prog-
ress is real, God exists. To doubt his existence is to doubt what we
most value and cherish in life and in thought and feeling—and this
is inconceivable. God is not a person in the literal or strict sense
of the term, but he has a personal aspect, since he personifies, to us,
our own personal qualities of goodness, virtue and moral beauty.
A\'hen we pray to God, we pra}- to a whole aspect of nature and
life, and prayer is efficacious, because something in us answers the
prayer and grants the favor sought. Prayer makes us purer, gent-
ler, sw^eeter, more human, and by afi^ecting us aft'ects nature—
though not what we may call physical phenomena, like wind, flood,
earthquakes, fire, etc.
It will be seen from the foregoing inadequate summary that Dr.
Ames is neither heterodox nor orthodox, but a cross between the
two tvpes. He has little sympathy with the ordinary modernist, and
none at all with the Humanist. He stresses the impossibility of
ignoring the supernatural or drawing a sharp distinction between
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it and the natural—agreeing in this respect with Professor Edding-
ton. He thinks the position of the Agnostic unscientific and un-
philosoi)hic. out of date and out of harmony with contemporary
habits of thought.
However, the unrej)entant Agnostic, while paying tribute to Dr.
Ames' sincerity and courage, will not hasten to surrender his posi-
tion unconditionall}' after reading the book under notice. After
all, Dr. Ames coins terms and makes definitions to suit himself. He
stretches logic rather violently when he contends that God is "per-
sonal" in a sense. And how many men would pray if they thought
they were praying to themselves—to their better natures—and ask-
ing these better selves to conquer the worse selves? If God is a
name for one side of natvire, the good and ideal side, what is the
name for the ugly, seamy, disagreeable and odious side or sides of
nature ? The Devil ? Again, how many intelligent persons will ac-
cept these definitions as satisfactory substitutes for the old and
conventional definitions or conceptions?
Rut, going a little deeper, let us ask whether Dr. Ames is not
guilty of a naive anthropomorphism in his reasoning regarding hu-
man nature and nature at large. It is true, and no one has ever
denied, that man is part of nature—what else, indeed, could he
conceivably be? But what grounds are there for magnifying his
importance in nature? ]\Ian is supposed to be the last word in
Evolution, but even if that is the case—and we cannot be sure, since
there may be life on other planets, and that life may have assumed
forms superior to ours—what ground is there for assuming that
man is of interest or significance to anybody save himself? IMan's
habitat is the tiny, un.stable, inconsequential globe. Man's destiny
is uncertain and his career is short and full of terrible misdeeds.
He is still rapacious, brutal, stupid and ignorant. He kills for fun
and is not ashamed. He slays his fellows without reason because
he is full of envy and malice. He is vain, petty and arrogant and
cannot be trusted with power. He is hypocritical, professing creeds
he has no intention of practicing. He is superstitious and gullible.
There is no evidence that his disappearance would cause a ripple
in the cosmos. What does he knoif of nature? Nothing. How
presumptuous, then, it is in him to propound theories concerning
his relation to nature and his role and place in nature.
Words may serve the purpose of concealing intellectual poverty.
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But the critical thinker is not deceived by words. The Agnostic is
first and last a critical thinker and a frank realist. He knows that
human knowledge is pitifully meager, and that it will always remain
meager so far as the ultimate problems of nature and life are con-
cerned. Man does well, indeed, to identify himself with his better
nature; he shows sense in endeavoring to make his existence more
and more comfortable; he is slowly learning the advantages of
kindliness, forbearance, mercy and generosity, and occasionallv he
rises to the plane he calls altruistic. He is to be encouraged to
persevere in his difficult and thorny upward march, but it behooves
him to remain humble and simple. He must bear in mind that noth-
ing is more ridiculous than pretension to wisdom where no wisdom
exists and where at every step one encounters insurmountable ob-
tacles to understanding.
The Agnostic, remembering all these things, refuses to claim
knowledge beyond science and empiricism. He will not accept Dr.
Ames' religion or philosophy of religion because they are largely
verbal and rhetorical creations.
